In this paper, the authors undertake a comparative analysis of democratic development in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. They argue that the socioeconomic structures and the political legacy of the previous authoritarian period have produced hybrid "democratic-authoritarian" regimes in both countries. Electoral rotation and open political competition are combined with episodic breaches in democratic procedures and only limited commitment to democratic norms among economic and political elites. In neither case has socioeconomic development in the twentieth century created any basis for cross-class consensus on democracy and capitalism. The normalization of democratic practices is vulnerable to economic crisis and there is a political and economic gulf between capital and labor. Lack of accountability is widespread and political parties suffer extremes of clientelism and personalism. Nonetheless, though breakdown of democracy remains a real possibility, both regimes have shown surprising durability for over a decade. The authors suggest that we may be witnessing a new regime variant, "crisis-prone democracy."
Introduction
Charting the historical paths to democracy has been a longstanding concern of political sociology. 1 With the demise of authoritarian rule in Latin America over the last decade, a classic question of the genre resurfaced: Are there certain developmental sequences that are more likely than others to produce successful transitions to democracy? If there is any conclusion to be drawn from recent experiences, the answer is no. Highly heterogeneous circumstances produced Latin America's most recent wave of democratization. From the Caribbean to the Southern Cone, countries at different levels of economic development, with distinctive authoritarian legacies and divergent class structures, all underwent transitions to elected civilian governments in the last decade.
In light of this fact, a different question must be posed: Exactly what kinds of democracies have emerged out of these diverse circumstances and transition processes? While the movement toward popularly elected governments has been a generic tendency in the region in recent years, there are significant variations among countries in the extent to which "normal" democratic practices structure the behavior of key actors. 2 At a minimum, the "normal" functioning of a contemporary democracy would include regular competition among parties for political power through free and fair elections, the institutionalization of civil liberties and the mass franchise, and the nonviolent processing of conflicts through institutional channels.
To understand how and why Latin American democracies deviate from the realm of "normal" democratic practices, comparative work is needed. In particular, we need to examine the complex interactions of class and state structures and how they defined the parameters under which democratization has taken place.
The Dominican Republic and Ecuador are important cases for comparative analysis of democratic development in Latin America for at least two reasons. First, they were unlikely 1 The classic work on the topic is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) . Also see the discussion of historical sequences in democratization in Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) . 2 This notion of "normality" and "abnormality" in a regime is taken from the discussion by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988): p. 65. They define "normality" as a situation in which "actors have settled on and obey a set of more or less explicit rules defining the channels they may use to gain access to governing roles, the means they can legitimately employ in their conflicts with each other, the procedures they should apply in taking decisions, and the criteria they may use to exclude others from the game." democratizers. In contrast to advanced capitalist democracies or the more industrialized countries of Latin America, the democratic transition in these two cases occurred under adverse sociostructural conditions. 3 These can be summarized as follows: 1) the political history of both countries is marked by a fragmentation and disorganization of civil society; 2) conservative elites dominated exclusionary political regimes that went largely unchallenged by suppressed and highly demobilized popular sectors; 3) their economies were largely dependent on agricultural exports, with a significant presence of foreign capital in the Dominican Republic; 4) sociostructural differentiation was retarded by industrialization that was late, even by Latin American standards; and 5) reformist middle classes, militant working classes, and a politically flexible bourgeoisie of the kind that supported the establishment of liberal democracy in Western Europe and populist regimes in the Southern Cone are weak or absent in our cases. Because of these adverse sociostructural conditions, study of the Dominican and Ecuadorean transitions probably has more relevance to transitions of other very late industrializing countries than the lessons of the Southern Cone where earlier industrialization and populism produced different historical actors and political opportunities.
Second, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador were the chronological leaders of the recent wave of democratic transitions in Latin America (in 1978 and 1979 respectively) . As such, they provide us with the longest time frame for analyzing post-transition political development.
Both countries have undergone more than two national elections since the transition and have experienced turnovers to opposition parties.
The central argument of this paper is that the socioeconomic structures and the political legacy of the previous authoritarian period have produced hybrid "democratic-authoritarian" regimes in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador. Such regimes are characterized by open political competition and free elections, but this is combined with episodic breaches in democratic procedures and a limited commitment to democratic norms among economic and political elites. In contrast to Adam Przeworski's argument that liberal democracy in advanced capitalist systems is a "contingent institutional compromise" among social forces based on a Keynesian economic project, our argument is that the recently installed democratic regimes in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador have not been the product of such class compromise. 4 Review 76, no. 76 (1982) . See also Przeworski's collection of essays, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) . emerge as a political arrangement to negotiate the relations between labor and capital, but as a vehicle for restructuring domination by economic and political elites in a context in which the lower classes were not highly mobilized or threatening.
Because of the lack of social and political consensus, the new civilian regimes in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are "crisis prone." Crisis resolution in these systems has revolved around the retention of nondemocratic behaviors that range from coup threats to authoritarian decision-making practices in the executive branch. Moreover, the "normalization" of democratic practices is further constrained by the current economic crisis. In addition to limiting the economic resources of the state, the management of the international debt problem creates incentives for politicians to insulate economic policy making from societal pressures; discussions are frequently removed from congressional debate, weakening the legislature as a policymaking body. Another striking characteristic of these political systems is the widespread lack of accountability-between government and parties, between legislators and parties, between parties and the masses. This is evident in a wide range of phenomena, from the dizzying shifts in partisan alliances to the abandonment of the goals of redistribution and participation by "progressive" parties. But in order to understand the contradictory character of these new political regimes, we must first examine the historical conditions that produced them.
State and Civil Society: The Organization of Exclusion
Until their recent transitions, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador were highly exclusionary political systems. The durability of dictatorial and oligarchic approaches to politics, the traditionally low levels of lower class political participation, and the relative "lateness" of democratization were part of the legacy of their export economies. 5 The integration of Ecuador into the international commodities market at the end of the nineteenth century produced a heterogeneous and fragmented class structure. At the top of the social pyramid were two sets of regional elites differentiated by economic interests. The coast was dominated by the agro-financial bourgeoisie of the port of Guayaquil, which controlled the cocoa trade. In the mountainous interior or sierra, a traditional landowning class maintained a hacienda system that produced for the internal market. Conflicts between these regional elites for control over the state took place in the electoral competition between the Liberal and Conservative 5 This overview of the historical development of these countries is based on our previous work. For a more detailed discussion of the Dominican case, see Rosario Espinal, Authoritarismo y democracia en la política dominicana (San José: CAPEL, 1987) parties, but also spilled over into nonelectoral seizures of power. Notwithstanding the serious tensions between these groups, there were no profound economic contradictions between the two and neither group ever attempted to use its control over the state to dismantle the economic base of its rival.
The integration of the Dominican Republic into the international market at the turn of the century was the result of the expansion of US direct foreign investment in the Caribbean. In contrast to Ecuador where a local oligarchy played a pivotal role in organizing the export sector and maintaining political order, the traditional Dominican elite did not control the sugar industry.
With the US military occupation of [1916] [1917] [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] , not only was the sugar economy controlled by foreign capital, but the state was dominated by an external power. As in other Caribbean and Central American countries, the embryonic local bourgeoisie found itself politically defeated and economically marginalized by the 1920s. Subsequent military dictatorships such as that of General Rafael Trujillo (1930 -1961 emerged as a national substitute for direct foreign domination.
While external dependence and internal infighting led to the eclipse of civilian elites and the emergence of a personalistic military dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, the greater autonomy and capacity for accommodation among Ecuador's dominant classes allowed for the development of an oligarchic electoral system that permitted a rotation of power. Ecuador's oligarchical electoralism was competitive in regard to parties but restricted in regard to the franchise-i.e., the party system was open, with leftist and populists participating, but registration and literacy requirements severely restricted the size and class composition of the electorate until the constitutional changes of 1978.
Conversely, under the Dominican political system engineered by Trujillo, single party domination hindered party competition even though there were no restrictions on the franchise by the 1940s. Trujillo created an electoral vehicle-the Dominican Party-to be used periodically to legitimate his power. He maintained extensive personal control of both the polity and the economy; elections were only designed to organize the population in support of the dictatorship.
The heyday of Ecuador's electoralism occurred in the "democratic parenthesis" from 1948 to 1961 when the presidency was transferred peacefully among the traditional parties. The evolution of the party system mirrored the character of the restricted electorate; there were the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties along with splinter groups from those parties.
Beginning in the 1930s, popular discontent was channelled through the highly conservative and coopted populism practiced by José María Velasco Ibarra. Notwithstanding his populist rhetoric, Velasco maintained close ties with traditional elites and never engaged in redistributive programs during any of his five terms as president. A new populist party emerged in the 1940s, the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), but its growth was constrained by its identification as a regional party of Guayaquil.
In the absence of concerted demands from below, there was limited pressure to alter oligarchic electoralism in Ecuador. Corporatist arrangements were woven into the fabric of the political system; corporate interest representation took place through the national producers' associations, the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. In addition to holding seats on policy-making boards inside the government, these business organizations were assigned "functional" senators in the national legislature. 
Authoritarianism in the 1970s: Setting the Stage for Transition
Antonio Gramsci's observation that a crisis is a situation in which "the old is dying and the new cannot be born" aptly describes both the circumstances under which modernizing authoritarian regimes were installed in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador and the political legacy they left behind. Rather than end the clash between the old-style politics and the new social realities, these governments engaged in contradictory policies that preserved a place for traditional powerholders while generating a context for regime transition.
The newly installed authoritarian regimes, military-based in Ecuador (1972 Ecuador ( -1979 and civilian in the Dominican Republic (1966 Republic ( -1978 , were economic modernizers. They undertook policies that expanded the overall size of the state, developed infrastructure, and promoted economic diversification through the channelling of state credit and investment. Together with Brazil, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic showed the highest rate of growth of manufacturing in Latin America for the period 1970-1975. 9 But even as the regimes presided over important changes in the role of the state and the structure of the economy, they did not subject societies to a fundamental restructuring of power relations. They did nothing to heighten the organizational and mobilization capacity of the lower classes, nor did they undermine the economic power bases of existing business elites. For the most part, the spectrum of political organization was essentially But this mild attempt at "reform from above" was short lived owing to the continuing ability of organized business elites to veto public policy and the unorganized and disparate character of the reform constituency. After an intense mobilization against the regime by business interest groups, Rodríguez Lara was sacked by more conservative elements in the Armed Forces in 1976.
The reformist agenda was completely shelved by the subsequent military junta led by Admiral Poveda Burbano (1976-79).
Although not completely parallel, the conservative modernization that occurred in the Dominican Republic under President Joaquín Balaguer (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) shares some of the features of to the Ecuadorean experience. The most significant is that the Balaguer administration pursued policies of economic growth while maintaining the political exclusion of popular sectors.
During the economic boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, wages were frozen and peasants were forced to subsidize urban expansion through government imposed price controls on agricultural products. The only mildly populist measure of the Balaguer regime was a limited agrarian reform enacted in 1972, which was designed by the government primarily to promote urban-industrial growth. The government kept the price of agricultural products low and encouraged large landowners to sell their land and diversify their investments.
Ecuador's status as an important oil exporter and high prices for Dominican sugar brought unprecedented economic growth and expansion in public revenues during the 1970s. Further import-substitution industrialization was fueled by the state's channelling credit and subsidies to the private sector. A peasant exodus to the cities contributed to the growth of the informal sector while the relative size of the industrial working class remained static due to the capital-intensive character of the new industry. Social differentiation accelerated as the expansion of public and private sector employment in services swelled the ranks of the middle classes. Dominant class interests became also more heterogeneous as grupos económicos diversified their portfolios. In short, the processes of social change that began during the export boom in the 1940s and 1950s accelerated with the export bonanza of the 1970s.
Yet it is important to keep in mind that the economic changes and the proliferation of "interests" was taking place within a context that limited the expressions of civil society. The channels for representing societal interests to the state were neither highly developed nor encompassing. In Ecuador, the most effective associations were those representing economic elite interests (e.g., the Chambers of Commerce, Industry, etc.). The organizational vehicles for representing mass interests were either embryonic (as was the case with "modern" parties like the In both cases, the lack of mechanisms for interest representation and predictable access to state policy makers became increasingly problematic for the bourgeoisie by the mid-1970s. In
Ecuador, the suspension of direct business participation in deliberations on economic policy was regarded by business as an usurpation of their traditional right to be heard in those matters. In the Dominican Republic, Balaguer's strategy of incorporating selected businessmen into advisory councils and state agencies alienated new entrepreneurs who were left outside of this very personalized arrangement. Thus, while the economic policies of both regimes were favorable to the private sector, the lack of mechanisms to integrate a wider range of business groups estranged many from the government and led them into opposition.
In Ecuador, the presence of a relatively organized and politically disaffected bourgeoisie The decline in support for authoritarianism in both countries, even among economic powerholders, set the stage for a political transition. Because the Balaguer government had maintained a formal institutional façade (e.g., legal opposition parties, Congress, a "democratic" constitution), Dominicans could avoid lengthy debates on how to structure the legal framework of the transition; the existing institutional structure could be used for a transition by simply abandoning the authoritarian practices (e.g., electoral fraud) under which they had operated. In
Ecuador, where the pre-existing constitutional order was suspended by the military intervention, the transition involved lengthy talks between military and civilian leaders starting in 1976 over the design of the constitution, laws governing the party system, and the scheduling of elections.
After a constitutional plebiscite, congressional elections, and a two-round presidential election, the transition was completed in August 1979 with the inauguration of President Jaime Roldos of the populist CFP.
Overall, the authoritarian-led modernization left a contradictory legacy for the regimes that followed. It generated a better organized bourgeoisie searching for political arrangements that would allow for a rational and reliable representation of their interests. Yet the newly established civilian governments were not the product of class compromise; they were not cemented as part of an attempt to smooth relations between labor and capital. It was not a transaction involving a trade of political rights and welfarism in exchange for social peace and the maintenance of capitalism. Rather, "democracy" was viewed by business groups as a vehicle for them to reassert influence over the policy process. And, given their limited capacity to articulate demands, popular classes were not viewed by business as a threatening political adversary. Consequently, democracy emerged as a safe political alternative to an authoritarianism past its prime.
This absence of class compromise has deeply affected the behavior and development of parties, classes, and interest groups in the post-transition regime. Democratic "rules" were suddenly superimposed on these peculiar environments where continuity with elements of the past rather than sharp dramatic discontinuity marked the transition. Capitalists, disenchanted with the authoritarian regimes, stood ready to assert their claims over the management of economic policy. While sometimes protesting, popular class counter-claimants remained divided and disorganized pre-existing parties were revived, reinjecting the party system with much of its old dynamics, especially personalism and clientelism. Yet, the rejuvenation of these traditional actors had its price; while the dominant role of conservative players probably facilitated the transition, the weight and the behavioral proclivities of these actors is placing limits on the institutionalization of democratic procedures inside the state and democratic practices in the body politic.
Post-Transitional Politics: Business and Labor
With popular classes posing no significant threat, business elites looked to democracy as an institutional arrangement worthy of loyalty only if it provided access and preferential policies.
Consequently, any "deviations" called into question their continued support for it. In Ecuador, the humiliating defeat of the right in the 1979 presidential election and the victory of Jaime Roldo's populist CFP put business organizations on guard and culminated in belligerent attacks upon the succeeding government of Osvaldo Hurtado. 10 While Hurtado undertook policies that were largely favorable to the private sector (e.g., a moderate economic stabilization program, a renegotiation of the international debt), Hurtado's aloofness and the insulation of the government economic team from lobbying created a perception within the business community of an "anti- In the Dominican Republic, the post-transition period was marked by: (1) the consolidation of the National Council of Businessmen (CNHE) as the peak business organization;
(2) an intense politicization of the CNHE; and (3) the control of its governing board by a conservative, communist-fearing anti-PRD faction. With a growing membership, the CNHE took on a direct political role in an effort to make it clear that it was willing to fight to defend business interests if threatened by the newly established government.
The CNHE confronted the first PRD government headed by President Antonio Guzmán Unlike that of the Dominican Republic, the Ecuadorean labor movement did take some halting steps toward greater unification over the last decade. Beginning in 1975, the three major trade union confederations started to engage in joint strike actions and constituted a steering organization, the Frente Unitario de Trabajadores (FUT). Since 1979, the FUT has sponsored eleven nationwide general strikes. Yet, the political and economic clout of trade unionism remains limited, in part because of its own internal diversity. The constituency of the trade union confederations in the FUT runs the gamut from rural laborers to public service employees to more traditional industrial workers. As such, there is a tremendous diversity in the working conditions of and the concrete demands emanating from these groups. Under the circumstances, the FUT has functioned largely as a defensive and reactive pressure group that views workers' interests in relation to their status as consumers; the FUT mobilizes in opposition to the "antipopular" measures enacted by the government such as price increases. Thus, the unity that has been forged in the labor movement has been carved out in relation to an external enemy, i.e., the government. 12
So far, the FUT has been unable to find an alternative development formula or a coherent program that encompasses the diverse interests it represents. Moreover, political competition during electoral periods dilutes even this "oppositional" unity in the labor movement as groups economy. Given these circumstances, popular demands and frustrations are expressed in a variety of ways. In both countries, grassroots neighborhood associations and other popular class organizations have sprung up and make highly specific demands on the local and national governments. The problem with these organizations, however, is that they are not organized around broader political goals. As such, they remain atomized and subject to control through clientelism. 14 The more threatening outbursts of popular discontent-food riots in the Dominican
Republic and the emergence of an urban guerrilla movement in Ecuador-have provoked repressive responses that call the integrity of the democratic regime into question.
The Disorganizing Party Systems
As our discussion shows, structural factors (i.e., extreme social heterogeneity, the pattern of economic growth and the effects of the economic crisis) have inhibited the development of lower class organizations capable of acting as effective counterweights to the power of the business lobby. This failure extends into the party system. Thus far, parties have been unable to act as engineers of a societywide consensus on capitalist economic development and democracy.
Representation and rationality crises are at the root of the problems inside the party system. Parties are plagued by weak links to groups in civil society and the inability of political elites to break free from traditional ways of doing politics marked by personalism, clientelism, and factionalism. Both of these problems contribute to the centrifugal and counterorganizational tendencies in the party systems. The economic crisis aggravates the struggle among political elites for control over resources and patronage, sometimes leading governing parties to abandon their electoral commitments to progressive goals and raising serious questions about the accountability of democratic institutions.
As noted earlier, Ecuadorean parties crystallized in an environment unfavorable to the development of strong mass-based parties. Restrictions on the franchise, oligarchic domination, and military intervention all worked to inhibit party development. A disdain for parties promulgated by leaders like José María Velasco Ibarra permeated Ecuadorean political discourse. Parties never acquired a heroic image as protagonists of democratization as did Peru's APRA, Venezuela's Acción Democrática, or the Dominican Revolutionary Party. Affective ties to party organization among activists as well as the rank and file remained weak so that competition for leadership slots and party nominations easily gave way to divisions and the creation of new parties.
14 Mishy Lesser, Conflicto y poder en un barrio popular de Quito (Quito: Editorial El Conejo, 1987) .
The centrifugal and counterorganizational tendencies in the Ecuadorean party system were unintentionally reinforced by some of the provisions in the new law regulating parties. The
Ley de Partidos, adopted during the transition process in 1978, gave powers to the Tribunal Supremo Electoral to limit the number of parties through licensing procedures and by forcing would-be candidates to affiliate with a legally registered party. In theory, the Tribunal was to use its powers to remove small parties from the electoral scene and check any further proliferation in the number of parties. In practice, the attempt at condensing and rationalizing the party system through juridical means was not a complete success. The Tribunal itself was reluctant to provoke controversy by removing small parties from the electoral register. And the provision requiring candidates for public office to join legally registered parties "forced" many of the politically ambitious into artificial and opportunistic associations. The weakness of these ties was reflected In the 1970s, bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) regimes emerged in the Southern Cone seeking to insulate economic policy from societal pressures; part of the process involved a forced demobilization of previously activated popular classes. Threatened by popular class demands, the upper bourgeoisie backed the BA regime and its attempts at economic normalization. 18 In the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, the political transition to democracy was facilitated by the bourgeoisie's search to fashion new (and more predictable) access to the state. Unlike the BA experiments where systematic repression was central to the refurbishing of business-state relations, disorganization among lower classes and within the party system effectively undercut the capacity of these actors to make reformist or redistributive demands on the system in the late 1970s. Thus, in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, the "reconquest" of political power by the bourgeoisie was compatible with electioneering and political competition because the popular threat level remained relatively low.
But even in this absence of substantive threat, a fine-tuning of democratic institutions to provide the predictability the bourgeoisie originally sought has not taken place. Instead, politicians remain stuck in irregular and unpredictable forms of conflict resolution, ranging from backroom deals to the use of physical force. Thus, a tangled play of institutional and extrainstitutional games remains part of the fabric of these hybrid political regimes.
and Democracy in the 1980s: The Latin American Experience" in Debt and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989): 201-223. 18 For the most recent discussion of the BA as a regime type, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966 -1973 , in Comparative Perspective, trans. James McGuire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988 .
